Skills/PyPI/mcp-portal

mcp-portal@0.1.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Stdio MCP server that delegates bulk reads and boilerplate generation to the Cursor CLI" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher apollion69 · publishing for 64 daysInstalls 184Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-portal

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_portal/delegate.py:177 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesor lower.startswith(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_portal/delegate.py:179 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesor lower.endswith((".pem", ".key", ".pfx", ".p12", ".env"))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_install_router.py:189 · Python subprocess execution detectedidentity = subprocess.run(['whoami', '/user', '/fo', 'csv', '/nh'], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_delegate.py:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor p in ("../outside", "/etc/passwd", "C:/secret", "a\\b", ".env", ".secrets/x", "a/secret.key", ".cursor/cli-config.json"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_portal/install_router.py:75 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(['powershell.exe', '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', '-EncodedCommand',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_portal/router.py:144 · Python subprocess execution detectedrun = subprocess.run(['powershell.exe', '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', '-File', str(script)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_delegate.py:72 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files(self.root / "large.txt").write_bytes(b"x" * (d.MAX_INPUT + 1))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_delegate.py:66 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(self.root / ".env").write_text("innocuous")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_install_router.py:181 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(['powershell.exe', '-NoProfile', '-NonInteractive', '-EncodedCommand',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_portal/delegate.py:579 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.Popen(argv, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_portal/install_router.py:54 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(['icacls', str(path), '/inheritance:r', '/grant:r', '*' + sid + ':(OI)(CI)F'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_portal/delegate.py:635 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["taskkill", "/PID", str(p.pid), "/T", "/F"], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_portal/install_router.py:52 · Python subprocess execution detectedidentity = subprocess.run(['whoami', '/user', '/fo', 'csv', '/nh'], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_portal/probe.py:24 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run([exe, *args], capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace", timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_delegate.py:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(self.root / "env-alias.txt").symlink_to(self.root / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/mcp_portal/delegate.py:420 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials# Resolved relative components must also pass credential filtering.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_portal/install_router.py:11 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processestests do not prove recovery after a hard process kill or power failure.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_router.py:123 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesinput=json.dumps(self.payload(file_path='large file.txt')), text=True, capture_output=True, env=env)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:65 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_router.py:122 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([sys.executable, '-m', 'mcp_portal.router', '--client', 'claude', '--shell', 'bash', '--receipt-dir', str(self.root / 'receipts')],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_install_router.py:191 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(['icacls', str(path), '/inheritance:r', '/grant:r', '*' + sid + ':F'], capture_output=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_router.py:172 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:183 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_router.py:110 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfor command in ("Get-Content 'large file.txt' -TotalCount 10", "Get-Content 'large file.txt' | Select-Object -First 10", 'Write-Output 12'):Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_router.py:138 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesself.assertEqual(router.route(self.payload(file_path='medium.txt'), 'claude', 'bash')['hookSpecificOutput']['permissionDecision'], 'deny')Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,205 tok
2 files · 26 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-portal@0.1.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim apollion69: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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