Skills/PyPI/mcp-portainer

mcp-portainer@2.45.3

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Portainer MCP server — manage Docker, Kubernetes, stacks, and Helm via the Model Context Protocol." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 3,397Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PORTAINER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: EXE, PORTAINER_MAX_RESPONSE_CHARS, PORTAINER_MCP_HTTP_HOST, PORTAINER_MCP_HTTP_PORT, PORTAINER_MCP_LOG_FORMAT, PORTAINER_MCP_LOG_LEVEL, PORTAINER_MCP_TRANSPORT, PORTAINER_PROFILES, PORTAINER_TAGS_EXTRA, PORTAINER_URL, STAGE, VERSION
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PORTAINER_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-portainer

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration.claude/skills/portainer-mcp-hygiene/SKILL.md:293 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimetoggling AutoUpdate with `StackUpdateGit` writes the new Git config and returnsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmake dev # local HTTP server via uv + .env (port 17717)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`make dev` requires `.env` (copy from `.env.example`). It runs the serverFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_auth.py:64 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"a" * 31 + "", # BOM / zero-width no-break spaceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationskills/portainer-mcp-hygiene/SKILL.md:293 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimetoggling AutoUpdate with `StackUpdateGit` writes the new Git config and returnsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_proxy.py:49 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files("/../etc/passwd", r"must not contain '\.\.'"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_auth.py:63 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"a" * 31 + "​", # zero-width spaceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Bidirectional text override characters detectedtests/test_auth.py:65 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content direction"a" * 31 + "‮", # right-to-left overrideFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 1. cp .env.example .env, fill in PORTAINER_URL, and setFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackaging/mcpb/build.sh:64 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y @anthropic-ai/[email protected] pack "$STAGE" "$PKG"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPORTAINER_MCP_TRANSPORT=http uv run --env-file .env portainer-mcpFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈22,079 tok
4 files · 63 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-portainer@2.45.3 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +2 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  5. Bidirectional text override characters detected≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
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