mcp-plugin@0.1.6
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Standalone MCP gateway — persistent connections to external MCP servers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
GITHUB_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_PLUGIN_FILE, SLIFE_AGENT_NAME, SLIFE_PLUGIN_NAME, SLIFE_SESSION_ID- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for GITHUB_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# kill this relay (a dead relay wedges the server's stderrFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill keeps Ctrl‑C exit snappy.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."args": ["-y", "anyapi-mcp-server", "--spec", "https://example.com/api.yaml"],Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.# ── REST-API helpers (rest_apis are ordinary npx anyapi server entries) ─Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.# — kill the whole group safely.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.are ordinary ``npx anyapi-mcp-server`` entries taggedFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.# ``stream()`` would ``aclose()`` it on exit and kill the readerFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.``/root/`` or ``/etc/shadow`` are naturally denied by the kernel.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.child shares the plugin's group, teardown can only kill the directFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""Build a server entry that serves *name* via ``npx anyapi-mcp-server``.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.5. Wait *force_timeout* seconds for kill to take effect.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# `/` so "https://host:8080/user@domain" (a port + path, NOT credentials) isFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# and can only kill the direct child — the grandchild survives,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.4. Force-kill if still running.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""save_rest_api — npx anyapi entry with a fetched_at-stamped source."""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.class TestMCPServerConnectionHTTP:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.# Own process group on POSIX so teardown can kill the wholeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-plugin@0.1.6 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim juzcn: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.