Skills/PyPI/mcp-plesk-dev-docs

mcp-plesk-dev-docs@0.6.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "A unified MCP server that indexes and retrieves Plesk documentation using vector embeddings and semantic search with reranking" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher barateza · publishing for 176 daysInstalls 111Last detonated 6d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-plesk-dev-docs -- uvx mcp-plesk-dev-docs
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OPENROUTER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: FORCE_DEVICE, LOG_HANDLER, PLESK_ENV_FILE, PLESK_HTML_LLM_TABLE_NORMALIZE, TQ_BITS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openrouter.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openrouter.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENROUTER_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-plesk-dev-docs

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedplesk_unified/io_utils.py:160 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run( # nosecFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_error_handling.py:122 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesraise PermissionError("Permission denied: '/etc/passwd'")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_error_handling.py:46 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexc = PermissionError("Permission denied: '/etc/passwd'")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsplesk_unified/settings.py:86 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# suppress .env loading by setting `PLESK_ENV_FILE=""` in the environment.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsplesk_unified/settings.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsplesk_unified/settings.py:80 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_env_file: str | None = os.environ.get("PLESK_ENV_FILE", ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsplesk_unified/settings.py:79 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Allow tests to suppress .env loading by setting PLESK_ENV_FILE="" or to another file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_model_config.py:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesos.environ["PLESK_ENV_FILE"] = "" # Suppress .env loadingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈71 tok
1 file · 52 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-plesk-dev-docs@0.6.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.