Skills/PyPI/mcp-placard

mcp-placard@0.7.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Static analysis and drift detection for the surface an MCP server exposes to an agent." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher lanier-developments · publishing for 58 daysInstalls 559Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso attacker.com, oasis-open.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-placard

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/mcp_placard/inject/patterns.py:791 · References a credential file in the home directoryThe sensitive-path patterns match a prefix — ``~/.ssh`` out of ``~/.ssh/id_rsa``,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_placard/inject/patterns.py:478 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"|(?<![\w/])\.env(\.[a-z]+)?\b(?!ironment)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/mcp_placard/inject/patterns.py:611 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content_ZERO_WIDTH = re.compile("[​‌‍‎‏⁠⁡⁢⁣⁤]+")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/mcp_placard/inject/patterns.py:799 · References a credential file in the home directory``~/.ssh/id_rsa`` is not. ``config_path`` may name ``~/.config`` and still not beFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Bidirectional text override characters detectedsrc/mcp_placard/inject/patterns.py:612 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content direction_BIDI = re.compile("[‪‫‬‭‮⁦⁧⁨⁩]+")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/mcp_placard/inject/patterns.py:798 · References a credential file in the home directory``~/.aws/credentials`` is naming its own subject; the same parameter pointed atFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_placard/inject/patterns.py:791 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesThe sensitive-path patterns match a prefix — ``~/.ssh`` out of ``~/.ssh/id_rsa``,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/mcp_placard/inject/patterns.py:792 · References a credential file in the home directory``~/.aws`` out of ``~/.aws/credentials`` — so comparing what they matched compares aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_index.py:131 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_index.py:96 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/mcp_placard/transport/launch.py:13 · References a credential file in the home directorythe real ``HOME`` would hand the server ``~/.npmrc``, ``~/.docker/config.json``,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/mcp_placard/config.py:284 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codef"server {server.name!r}: npx target {spec!r} is not pinned to a version; "Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_placard/inject/patterns.py:792 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``~/.aws`` out of ``~/.aws/credentials`` — so comparing what they matched compares aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionAGENTS.md:47 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| `placard verify <manifest.json>` | Recompute and check manifest hashes |Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_placard/inject/surface.py:125 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesone at ``file:///var/log/app.log`` may not mention ``~/.ssh/id_rsa``. Empty meansFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_cli.py:63 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesnew = _write(tmp_path / "new.json", tool_wire("a"), tool_wire("b", input_schema=purge))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_placard/inject/surface.py:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespaths is doing its job; a weather tool mentioning ``~/.ssh`` is not).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/mcp_placard/inject/surface.py:125 · References a credential file in the home directoryone at ``file:///var/log/app.log`` may not mention ``~/.ssh/id_rsa``. Empty meansFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_index.py:80 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/mcp_placard/config.py:20 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codetarget = "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/[email protected]"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionAGENTS.md:46 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| `placard report <manifest.json>` | Human-readable Markdown or SARIF output |Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_index.py:123 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(sandbox)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/mcp_placard/signing.py:105 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"chmod 600 it — a shared key signs nothing"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_index.py:95 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["uv", "venv", "-q", str(py_venv)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,504 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-placard@0.7.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim lanier-developments: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  5. Bidirectional text override characters detected≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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