mcp-patch@0.1.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Security scanner for Python MCP server code" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
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- no vendor host named in the code
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- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
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Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
# os.system(f"...{param}...") or os.popen(...)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell." subprocess.run('echo %s' % name, shell=True)\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""os.system(f'...{param}...') must be flagged."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return os.popen(f"find / -name {pattern}").read()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell." subprocess.run('uptime', shell=True)\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""os.popen(f'...{param}...') must be flagged."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system(f"ls -la {path}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.fix="Use subprocess.run([...], shell=False) instead of os.system/os.popen",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""subprocess.run(f'...{param}...', shell=True) must be flagged."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([cmd], shell=False, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(command, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(f"echo {cmd}", shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen("gcc {}".format(source), shell=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out." subprocess.run(f'ls {cmd}', shell=True)\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.fix="Use subprocess.run([cmd, shlex.quote(arg)]) without shell=True",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-patch@0.1.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim 0-co: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.