Skills/PyPI/mcp-paradigm

mcp-paradigm@0.1.4

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for the Paradigm trading platform (DRFQv2 + FSPD)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher tradeparadigm · publishing for 170 daysInstalls 80Last detonated 6d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-paradigm -- uvx mcp-paradigm
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PARADIGM_ACCESS_KEYPARADIGM_SIGNING_DRIVERPARADIGM_SIGNING_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, PARADIGM_ACCOUNT, PARADIGM_BASE_URL, PARADIGM_ENVIRONMENT, PARADIGM_FSPD_BASE_URL, PARADIGM_SIGNER_HEADER, PARADIGM_SIGNER_SIGNATURE, PARADIGM_TIMEOUT, PARADIGM_WS_BUFFER, PARADIGM_WS_TTL, PARADIGM_WS_URL, SERVER_NAME, SERVER_PORT
Where it talks to
paradigm.trade, paradigm.co (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PARADIGM_ACCESS_KEY, PARADIGM_SIGNING_DRIVER, PARADIGM_SIGNING_KEY and talks to paradigm.trade, paradigm.co. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets PARADIGM_ACCESS_KEY=paradigm.trade,PARADIGM_SIGNING_DRIVER=paradigm.trade,PARADIGM_SIGNING_KEY=paradigm.trade -- uvx mcp-paradigm

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_paradigm/tools/workflow.py:1 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Cross-product workflow tools — desk health and kill switch.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_paradigm/tools/workflow.py:141 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesDESTRUCTIVE. Use as a kill switch when something's gone wrong orFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcp_paradigm/tools/drfqv2/orders.py:147 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFor a global kill switch across all products, useFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_paradigm/utils/config.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesLoads from environment variables (and `.env` via python-dotenv). AllFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 56 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-paradigm@0.1.4 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.