Skills/PyPI/mcp-outline

mcp-outline@1.11.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Outline (https://www.getoutline.com)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher vortiago · publishing for 607 daysInstalls 1,398Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OUTLINE_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, OUTLINE_API_URL, OUTLINE_CACHE_MAX_SIZE, OUTLINE_CACHE_TTL, OUTLINE_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, OUTLINE_DISABLE_AI_TOOLS, OUTLINE_DISABLE_DELETE, OUTLINE_DISABLE_RECENT_DOCUMENTS, OUTLINE_DYNAMIC_TOOL_LIST, OUTLINE_MAX_CONNECTIONS, OUTLINE_MAX_KEEPALIVE, OUTLINE_READ_ONLY, OUTLINE_TIMEOUT, OUTLINE_VERIFY_SSL, OUTLINE_WRITE_TIMEOUT
Where it talks to
getoutline.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for OUTLINE_API_KEY and talks to getoutline.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets OUTLINE_API_KEY=getoutline.com -- uvx mcp-outline

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 6. Add token to .env as OUTLINE_API_KEY=<your-token>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_outline/server.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_config_path = Path.home() / ".config" / "mcp-outline" / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:27 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/settings.json:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"command": "for f in $CLAUDE_FILE_PATHS; do case \"$f\" in *.env|*.env.*|uv.lock|*.lock) echo \"BLOCK: refusing to edit $f\" >&2; exit 1;; esac; done"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:344 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`.env` file:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.vscode/tasks.json:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"command": "npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector docker run -i --rm --init -e DOCKER_CONTAINER=true --env-file .env mcp-outline",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_outline/utils/outline_client.py:159 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"~/.config/mcp-outline/.env (user), "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstart_server.sh:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexport $(grep -v '^#' .env | xargs)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.json:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"description": "Outline API key (Settings > API). Can also be set in ~/.config/mcp-outline/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:94 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions · informational: not an instruction file<summary>Claude Code</summary> ```bash claude mcp add mcp-outline uvx mcp-outline ``` Installing the repo as a plugin instead also bundles the `outline-explorerFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_outline.egg-info/scm_file_list.json:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo command.vscode/tasks.json:9 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"command": "sudo docker buildx build -t mcp-outline .",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_health.py:106 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringapi_url="http://192.0.2.1:1/api",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_health.py:60 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/e2e/conftest.py:303 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/e2e/conftest.py:291 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_health.py:106 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameapi_url="http://192.0.2.1:1/api",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,619 tok
3 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-outline@1.11.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vortiago: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. URL using a raw public IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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