mcp-oura@0.4.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "The Oura v2 API as an MCP server. Paginates, fixes the date range, warns when data is missing." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
OAUTH_KVOAUTH_PROVIDEROURA_CLIENT_SECRETOURA_CREDENTIALSOURA_PATOURA_TOKENSConfiguration, not credentials: OURA_API_BASE_URL, OURA_CLIENT_ID, OURA_NO_KEYCHAIN, OURA_OWNER_EMAIL, OURA_PAT_FILE, OURA_PYTHON, OURA_SANDBOX, OURA_SMOKE_CMD, OURA_TIMEZONE- Where it talks to
- ouraring.com (its own)Also pydantic.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names pydantic.dev as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OAUTH_KV, OAUTH_PROVIDER, OURA_CLIENT_SECRET, OURA_CREDENTIALS, OURA_PAT, OURA_TOKENS only into requests to ouraring.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
from .credentials import credentials_path, forgetFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.from .credentials import loadFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.cd ts && npx vitest run # 127 more, same ruleFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx wrangler dev --port 8787 --var OURA_SANDBOX:1 \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.from .credentials import SCOPES, loadFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.from .credentials import load, refreshFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.RUN pip install --no-cache-dir . && rm -rf /srcFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.from .credentials import (SCOPES, AUTORIZAR_URL, DEFAULT_REDIRECT,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.("a missing browser opener does not kill the process", "ts/src/authorize.ts",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=300)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(["node", "--input-type=module", "-e", guion],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.npx tscFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.("a stray callback does not kill the process", "ts/src/authorize.ts",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.is computed here, `llms.txt` says an average computed inside arrives without itsFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.# THE PACKAGE IS SCOPED; the binary it installs is not. `npx mcpb` resolves onlyFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.r = subprocess.run(["node", "--input-type=module", "-e", guion],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.reason="needs node and a compiled ts/dist (run `cd ts && npx tsc`)",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.r = subprocess.run(["node", "--input-type=module", "-e", guion],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(["node", "--input-type=module", "-e", guion],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# npx wrangler dev --port 8787 --var OURA_SANDBOX:1 --var OURA_TIMEZONE:America/Mexico_CityFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.- **ChatGPT** — *Settings → Apps → Advanced settings → Developer mode*, thenFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.connectors in claude.ai take any URL on any plan, and ChatGPT's developer modeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.npx ${NPM_CACHE:+--cache "$NPM_CACHE"} --yes @anthropic-ai/[email protected] \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.connectors in claude.ai take any URL on any plan, and ChatGPT's developer modeFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.// ── Opening the browser must not be able to kill the server ────────────────Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.clean, and the response looked identical to one that was never refused.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.* refresh token, and the second exchange would kill the session the first hadFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Anywhere else npx asks the registry for a package literally named `mcpb`, getsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.- **ChatGPT** — *Settings → Apps → Advanced settings → Developer mode*, thenFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-oura@0.4.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim proscar87: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.