Skills/PyPI/mcp-opensearch

mcp-opensearch@0.3.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Read-only MCP server for OpenSearch and OpenSearch Dashboards" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher bunnyiesart · publishing for 141 daysInstalls 43Last detonated 6d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-opensearch -- uvx mcp-opensearch
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OPENSEARCH_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: OPENSEARCH_ALLOW_INSECURE_CONFIG, OPENSEARCH_DASHBOARDS_URL, OPENSEARCH_MAX_HISTOGRAM_BUCKETS, OPENSEARCH_MAX_SEARCH_LIMIT, OPENSEARCH_TIMEOUT, OPENSEARCH_URL, OPENSEARCH_USERNAME, OPENSEARCH_VERIFY_SSL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for OPENSEARCH_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-opensearch

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.4sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:86 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "Or use env vars (e.g. in a .env file):"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandlib/client.py:777 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"Run: chmod 600 {CONFIG_FILE}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsetup.sh:83 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CONFIG_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsetup.sh:84 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsecho "Config saved to $CONFIG_FILE (chmod 600)"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesENV_FILE := $(HOME)/.config/mcp-opensearch/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 15 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-opensearch@0.3.3 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.