mcp-openapi-proxy@0.4.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for exposing OpenAPI specifications as MCP tools." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
API_AUTH_HEADERAPI_AUTH_TYPEAPI_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ADDITIONAL_RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES_PROMPTS, CAPABILITIES_RESOURCES, CAPABILITIES_TOOLS, ENABLE_PROMPTS, ENABLE_RESOURCES, ENABLE_TOOLS, EXTRA_HEADERS, IGNORE_SSL_SPEC, IGNORE_SSL_TOOLS, MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_HOST, MCP_PATH, MCP_REQUEST_STATE_KEY, MCP_SERVER_DESCRIPTION, MCP_SERVER_NAME, MCP_SERVER_TITLE, MCP_TRANSPORT, OPENAPI_SERVER_NAME, OPENAPI_SIMPLE_MODE, OPENAPI_SPEC_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS, OPENAPI_SPEC_FORMAT, OPENAPI_SPEC_URL, SERVER_URL_OVERRIDE, STRIP_PARAM, TOOL_NAME_MAX_LENGTH, TOOL_NAME_PREFIX, TOOL_WHITELIST- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso dummy.com, virustotal.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names dummy.com, virustotal.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_AUTH_HEADER, API_AUTH_TYPE, API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
<summary><b>Glama Example</b> — the most minimal config: just <code>OPENAPI_SPEC_URL</code>, no auth</summary> ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/asseFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# Load environment variables from .env if presentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.<summary><b>Box API Example</b> — developer-token access to Box content</summary> You can integrate the Box Platform API using your own developer token for authFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-openapi-proxy@0.4.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.