Skills/PyPI/mcp-openai-acedatacloud

mcp-openai-acedatacloud@2026.10.4.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server for OpenAI API via AceDataCloud" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher acedatacloud · publishing for 297 daysInstalls 805Last detonated 6d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-openai-acedatacloud -- uvx mcp-openai-acedatacloud
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ACEDATACLOUD_API_TOKENACEDATACLOUD_AUTH_BASE_URLACEDATACLOUD_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDConfiguration, not credentials: ACEDATACLOUD_API_BASE_URL, ACEDATACLOUD_PLATFORM_BASE_URL, MCP_SERVER_NAME, MCP_SERVER_URL, MCP_TRANSPORT, OPENAI_REQUEST_TIMEOUT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso acedata.cloud, webhook.site — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names acedata.cloud, webhook.site as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ACEDATACLOUD_API_TOKEN, ACEDATACLOUD_AUTH_BASE_URL, ACEDATACLOUD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-openai-acedatacloud

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscore/config.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_env_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:94 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(dotenv_path=project_root / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscore/config.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env file from project rootFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env file BEFORE any other importsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 46 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-openai-acedatacloud@2026.10.4.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.