Skills/PyPI/mcp-observe

mcp-observe@0.2.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "One-line SDK that captures every MCP tool call and sends it to a dashboard." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher phytonking · publishing for 256 daysInstalls 17Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_OBSERVE_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_OBSERVE_ENDPOINT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_observe/proxy.py:62 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_policy.py:123 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesself.assertEqual(evaluate(rules, DEFAULT_SETTINGS, "filesystem", "call", {"path": "/etc/passwd"}).result, "deny")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_policy.py:416 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesself.assertEqual(evaluate(rules, DEFAULT_SETTINGS, "filesystem", "read", {"path": "/etc/shadow"}).result, "deny")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_policy.py:403 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviced = evaluate(STRICT_RULES, STRICT_SETTINGS, "shell", "execute", {"command": "rm -rf /"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_proxy.py:14 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_policy.py:403 · Destructive file system command detectedd = evaluate(STRICT_RULES, STRICT_SETTINGS, "shell", "execute", {"command": "rm -rf /"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_policy.py:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesrules = [{"id": "r7", "what": "test", "match": {"tool": "filesystem", "parameters": {"path": "/etc/passwd"}}, "action": "deny", "reason": "test", "risk": "low"}]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_policy.py:103 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesself.assertEqual(evaluate(rules, DEFAULT_SETTINGS, "filesystem", "call", {"path": "/etc/passwd"}).result, "deny")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 30 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-observe@0.2.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim phytonking: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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