Skills/PyPI/mcp-novelaigen

mcp-novelaigen@0.2.21

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "A NovelAI image generation tool as an MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher kilo-code · publishing for 464 daysInstalls 26Last detonated 6d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-novelaigen -- uvx mcp-novelaigen
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
NOVELAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: IMAGESERVER_IMAGE_KEY, PROJECT_BASE_PATH, PROXY_SERVER, SERVER_PORT, VarHttpsUrl, VarHttpUrl
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso rikka-ai.com, novelai.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names rikka-ai.com, novelai.net as well as its own vendor. The guard injects NOVELAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-novelaigen

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrikkahub-master/i18n/CLAUDE.md:49 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesCreate `.env` file with AI provider API keys:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstest_mcp_service.py:7 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringMCP_SERVER_URL = "http://142.171.230.23:45678/mcp"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandrikkahub-master/.github/workflows/release.yml:42 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x gradlewFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionrikkahub-master/ai/src/test/java/me/rerere/ai/util/JsonTest.kt:6 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesimport kotlinx.serialization.json.putFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrikkahub-master/i18n/CLAUDE.md:144 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- API key issues: Verify `.env` configuration and quotaFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstest_mcp_service.py:7 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameMCP_SERVER_URL = "http://142.171.230.23:45678/mcp"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)test_mcp_service.py:7 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkMCP_SERVER_URL = "http://142.171.230.23:45678/mcp"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,168 tok
3 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-novelaigen@0.2.21 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

mcp-novelaigen@0.2.21 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills