Skills/PyPI/mcp-notify

mcp-notify@0.1.11

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server for notify" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher aahl · publishing for 393 daysInstalls 543Last detonated 6d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-notify -- uvx mcp-notify
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
HASS_ACCESS_TOKENPUSH_PLUS_TOKENTELEGRAM_BOT_TOKENWEWORK_APP_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: BARK_BASE_URL, BARK_DEVICE_KEY, DINGTALK_BASE_URL, DINGTALK_BOT_KEY, FEISHU_BASE_URL, HASS_BASE_URL, HASS_MOBILE_KEY, LARK_BASE_URL, LARK_BOT_KEY, NTFY_BASE_URL, NTFY_DEFAULT_TOPIC, PUSH_PLUS_BASE_URL, TELEGRAM_BASE_URL, TELEGRAM_DEFAULT_CHAT, TRANSPORT, WEWORK_APP_AGENTID, WEWORK_APP_CORPID, WEWORK_APP_TOUSER, WEWORK_BASE_URL, WEWORK_BOT_KEY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso a.com, homeassistant.local, nest.com, dingtalk.com, feishu.cn, larksuite.com, day.app, ntfy.sh, pushplus.plus, telegram.org, baidu.com, qq.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names a.com, homeassistant.local, nest.com, dingtalk.com, feishu.cn, larksuite.com, day.app, ntfy.sh, pushplus.plus, telegram.org, baidu.com, qq.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects HASS_ACCESS_TOKEN, PUSH_PLUS_TOKEN, TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN, WEWORK_APP_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-notify

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 95/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 1,758 lines in 23 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈41 tok
1 file · 23 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-notify@0.1.11 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.