Skills/PyPI/mcp-network-jcd

mcp-network-jcd@0.3.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for network device queries (Palo Alto, Cisco IOS via SSH; F5 BIG-IP via iControl REST)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher jcdecaux-build-infra · publishing for 288 daysInstalls 21Last detonated 6d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-network-jcd -- uvx mcp-network-jcd
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CISCO_ENABLE_PASSWORDCISCO_PASSWORDF5_PASSWORDPALOALTO_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: CISCO_USERNAME, F5_USERNAME, PALOALTO_USERNAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for CISCO_ENABLE_PASSWORD, CISCO_PASSWORD, F5_PASSWORD, PALOALTO_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-network-jcd

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/integration/test_f5_rest.py:60 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetassert call_args[0][1] == "https://10.0.0.1/mgmt/tm/ltm/pool/mypool/members"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/commands/speckit.implement.md:86 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- **Kotlin**: `build/`, `out/`, `.gradle/`, `.idea/`, `*.class`, `*.jar`, `*.iml`, `*.log`, `.env*`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detected.specify/scripts/bash/update-agent-context.sh:112 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/manual_additions_$$Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detected.specify/scripts/bash/update-agent-context.sh:111 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/agent_update_*_$$Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/commands/speckit.implement.md:84 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- **PHP**: `vendor/`, `*.log`, `*.cache`, `*.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/integration/test_f5_rest.py:23 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetassert call_args[0][1] == "https://10.0.0.1/mgmt/tm/ltm/pool/mypool"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/integration/test_f5_rest.py:74 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetassert call_args[0][1] == "https://10.0.0.1/mgmt/tm/ltm/virtual/myvip/policies"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/integration/test_f5_rest.py:41 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetassert call_args[0][1] == "https://10.0.0.1/mgmt/tm/ltm/irule/my_irule"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/commands/speckit.implement.md:87 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- **C++**: `build/`, `bin/`, `obj/`, `out/`, `*.o`, `*.so`, `*.a`, `*.exe`, `*.dll`, `.idea/`, `*.log`, `.env*`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/commands/speckit.implement.md:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- **Node.js/JavaScript/TypeScript**: `node_modules/`, `dist/`, `build/`, `*.log`, `.env*`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/commands/speckit.implement.md:85 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- **Rust**: `target/`, `debug/`, `release/`, `*.rs.bk`, `*.rlib`, `*.prof*`, `.idea/`, `*.log`, `.env*`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/integration/test_f5_rest.py:32 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetassert call_args[0][1] == "https://10.0.0.1/mgmt/tm/ltm/virtual"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈765 tok
2 files · 69 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-network-jcd@0.3.3 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.