Skills/PyPI/mcp-multi-server

mcp-multi-server@1.2.5

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "A Python library for managing connections to multiple Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher apisani1 · publishing for 341 daysInstalls 30Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-multi-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun.sh:720 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "Error: TEST_PYPI_TOKEN not found in environment or .env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun.sh:675 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# If key is defined in .env (even if empty), return itFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun.sh:655 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 1. .env file (project-local)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun.sh:664 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslocal file="$THIS_DIR/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release.py:263 · Python subprocess execution detectedtag_dt = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release.py:268 · Python subprocess execution detectedtag_dt = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun.sh:667 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 1. Check .env first (project-first policy)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/tests.yml:31 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y libjpeg-dev zlib1g-dev libpng-dev libfreetype6-devFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_client_example.py:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestool_result = await client.call_tool("get_file", {"file_path": "/etc/passwd"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandrun.sh:402 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsecho " chmod +x scripts/run.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:249 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Publish to PyPI using token from .env (strict mode)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:241 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Publish to TestPyPI using token from .env (strict mode)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release.py:251 · Python subprocess execution detectedtags = subprocess.check_output(["git", "tag"], text=True).splitlines()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_inventory_db_pickle.py:35 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, "initialize_db.py", str(path)], cwd=script_dir, check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/tests.yml:30 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release.py:278 · Python subprocess execution detectedcommit_messages = subprocess.check_output(["git", "log", f"{range}", "--pretty=format:%s"], text=True).splitlines()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release.py:200 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["git", "status", "--porcelain"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,882 tok
2 files · 62 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-multi-server@1.2.5 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim apisani1: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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