Skills/PyPI/mcp-moodle

mcp-moodle@0.1.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server exposing Moodle Web Services to AI assistants (Claude, Cursor, etc.)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher snaw80 · publishing for 179 daysInstalls 34Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MOODLE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: MOODLE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso example.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names example.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MOODLE_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-moodle

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/moodle_mcp/get_token.py:105 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialspassFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/moodle_mcp/get_token.py:317 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsprint(f" Wrote {env_file} (chmod 600)", file=sys.stderr)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/moodle_mcp/get_token.py:120 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/moodle_mcp/get_token.py:346 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileshelp="Where to write MOODLE_URL/MOODLE_TOKEN (default: ./.env, chmod 600).",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/moodle_mcp/get_token.py:29 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmcp-moodle-token https://moodle.example.org --env-file path/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/moodle_mcp/get_token.py:392 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"(reads MOODLE_URL/MOODLE_TOKEN from .env, never echoes the token):\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/moodle_mcp/get_token.py:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsBy default the token is written to ./.env (chmod 600) and only a maskedFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/moodle_mcp/get_token.py:345 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdefault=Path(".env"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/moodle_mcp/get_token.py:346 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionshelp="Where to write MOODLE_URL/MOODLE_TOKEN (default: ./.env, chmod 600).",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/moodle_mcp/get_token.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesBy default the token is written to ./.env (chmod 600) and only a maskedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 11 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-moodle@0.1.2 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim snaw80: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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