mcp-mesh@3.8.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Python SDK for MCP Mesh — build distributed AI agents with auto-discovery, dependency injection, and LLM integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso a2a-protocol.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# function, no wrapper) whenever the raise does NOT kill theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# does not kill the process.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.fastmcp_http_app = fastmcp_server.http_app(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.self._mcp_app = mcp_server.http_app(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.if hasattr(fastmcp_server, "http_app") and callable(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.fastmcp_server.http_appFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Gracefully terminate a process and all its children, force kill if needed.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.self._mcp_app = mcp_server.http_app(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.# Force kill the entire process groupFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if hasattr(mcp_server, "http_app") and callable(mcp_server.http_app):Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.# not kill the process.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-mesh@3.8.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.