mcp-manager.io@1.1.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for Manager.io bookkeeping: read-first with opt-in scoped task and write tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MANAGER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MANAGER_API_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso manager.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names manager.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MANAGER_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
self.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return [f"{m} {p}" for m, p in self.log if m in ("POST", "PUT", "DELETE")]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.fake.log.append(("POST", "/sales-invoice-form"))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why."http://192.168.1.20:55667/api2",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.exceeding it raises LimitOverrunError and used to kill the supervisor.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell._load_dotenv(_ROOT / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=cwd, check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."http://10.0.0.5/api2",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."(repo-root .env; see .env.example)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-manager.io@1.1.0 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.