Skills/PyPI/mcp-keep-feedback

mcp-keep-feedback@0.2.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Enhanced MCP server for interactive user feedback and command execution in AI-assisted development, featuring Web UI with intelligent environment detection and cross-platform compatibility." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ffpy-q1411603774 · publishing for 250 daysInstalls 50Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-keep-feedback` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/mcp-keep-feedback
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/cleanup_cache.py:68 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/publish.sh:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslocal env_file="$PROJECT_ROOT/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/static/js/modules/file-upload-manager.js:43 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('📁 FileUploadManager 初始化完成');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release.py:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = project_root / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/models/feedback_session.py:111 · Destructive file system command detected"del /f",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/utils/cli_client.py:98 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/publish.sh:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint_info "请在 .env 文件中设置: PYPI_TOKEN=pypi-xxx"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release.py:134 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"PYPI_TOKEN 未设定。请在专案根目录 .env 设定，"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/publish.sh:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 加载 .env 文件Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/models/feedback_session.py:578 · Python subprocess execution detectedself.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/static/js/modules/file-upload-manager.js:59 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('✅ FileUploadManager 事件委托设置完成');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/static/js/modules/file-upload-manager.js:161 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('🖱️ 触发档案选择:', fileInput.id);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/static/js/modules/prompt/prompt-input-buttons.js:67 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('✅ PromptInputButtons 初始化完成，成功绑定', successCount, '组按钮');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/static/js/modules/prompt/prompt-input-buttons.js:419 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('🗑️ PromptInputButtons 已销毁');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/static/js/modules/prompt/prompt-input-buttons.js:35 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('🔘 PromptInputButtons 初始化完成');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/utils/browser.py:83 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/static/js/modules/file-upload-manager.js:547 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('🧹 FileUploadManager 资源已清理');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/static/js/modules/prompt/prompt-input-buttons.js:425 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('✅ PromptInputButtons 模组载入完成');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agentsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/templates/components/image-upload.html:28 · HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agent · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file<span data-i18n="images.settings.compatibilityHint">💡 图片无法正确识别？</span> <button type="button" id="{{ id_prefix }}EnableBase64Hint" class="compatibility-hint-btnFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/utils/browser.py:66 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/utils/browser.py:100 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/mcp_keep_feedback/web/static/js/modules/file-upload-manager.js:503 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('⚙️ FileUploadManager 设定已更新:', {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈86 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-keep-feedback@0.2.2 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ffpy-q1411603774: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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