Skills/PyPI/mcp-ingest

mcp-ingest@0.1.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "SDK + CLI to describe, validate, and register MCP servers into MatrixHub" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher matrixhub-contributors · publishing for 461 daysInstalls 21Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 56/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; README links to an external installer; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandMakefile:171 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions@chmod +x ../catalog/scripts/*.py ../catalog/test-workflow-locally.sh 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_register.sh:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Reads .env (if present) so you can keep HUB_URL, API_TOKEN, TARGET_DIR, etc. there.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_register.sh:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ -f .env ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_register.sh:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# ---------- load .env (optional) ----------Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_ingest/utils/fetch.py:389 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/push_to_matrix.sh:60 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingecho "https://${user_part}:${tok}@github.com/${url#https://github.com/}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
README links to an external installerREADME.md → https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/archive/refs/heads/main.ziphttps://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers/archive/refs/heads/main.zipFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_ingest/publishers/static_index.py:74 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_register.sh:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessource .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/push_to_matrix.sh:66 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingecho "https://${GITHUB_USER}:${GITHUB_TOKEN}@github.com/${url#https://github.com/}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_ingest/utils/git.py:60 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedservices/harvester/workers/runner.py:21 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_ingest/validate/sandbox.py:62 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-ingest@0.1.1 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

24 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim matrixhub-contributors: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. README links to an external installer≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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