mcp-haystack@2.1.1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Haystack integration for Model Context Protocol (MCP)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso my-mcp-server.com, some-remote-server.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
server_process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.server = oauth_mcp_server("streamable-http")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.url="https://my-mcp-server.com/sse",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.server = oauth_mcp_server("streamable-http")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.server = oauth_mcp_server("streamable-http", expires_in=2)Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.server_process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.logger.warning("Server process still hanging after kill during cleanup")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Unit tests for MCPServerInfo classes."""Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-haystack@2.1.1 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.