Skills/PyPI/mcp-google-search-console-crunchtools

mcp-google-search-console-crunchtools@0.5.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Secure MCP server for Google Search Console analytics, sitemaps, and URL inspection" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher crunchtools.com · publishing for 273 daysInstalls 72Last detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-google-search-console-crunchtools -- uvx mcp-google-search-console-crunchtools
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GSC_CLIENT_SECRETGSC_CREDENTIALS_DIRGSC_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URIGSC_REFRESH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: GSC_BASE_URL, GSC_CLIENT_ID, GSC_RESOURCE_SERVER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GSC_CLIENT_SECRET, GSC_CREDENTIALS_DIR, GSC_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI, GSC_REFRESH_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-google-search-console-crunchtools

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_validation.py:54 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceencode_site_url("https://example.com; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_resource_server.py:57 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"http://user:pass@mcp-gsc:8017",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:99 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><strong>Manual OAuth flow</strong></summary> ```bash export GSC_CLIENT_ID="your_client_id_here" export GSC_CLIENT_SECRET="your_client_secret_here" echoFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_validation.py:54 · Destructive file system command detectedencode_site_url("https://example.com; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_client.py:217 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://bot:[email protected]/webmasters/v3/sites",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedCLAUDE.md:17 · Destructive file system command detected-- podman run -i --rm \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈886 tok
2 files · 52 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-google-search-console-crunchtools@0.5.2 as of 2d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.