mcp-gog-bridge@0.1.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server exposing the whole gog CLI (Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Docs, Sheets, Slides, Contacts) to Claude Desktop through two policed tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.- It will ask for
- unknown until the next run
- Where it talks to
- unknown until the next run
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-gog-bridge` runs it now and prints the full answer.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
working directory is not a place to pick up a file from. `.env.example` documents theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- **No `.env` file.** `Settings` reads the process environment only; Claude Desktop'sFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# too: the .cmd wrapper, CREATE_NO_WINDOW and the process-tree kill areFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.wrapper, `exec` matters: without it the kill on timeout hits the shell and leaves PythonFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# answers anyway. Only reached when a kill did not take.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.`StreamReader` raises "another coroutine is already waiting". On win32 the kill isFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.has no working directory worth trusting, so no .env file is consulted: the envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-gog-bridge@0.1.0 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.