Skills/PyPI/mcp-core-auth

mcp-core-auth@0.6.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Auth, billing, and logging infrastructure for MCP-first servers." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher swapp1990 · publishing for 200 daysInstalls 552Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-core-auth` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 65/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; document.cookie access; References a credential file in the home directory. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/mcp-core-check-readiness
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`tests/live/` needs `.env.live` (gated live tests; do not run them as part of the default suite).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
document.cookie accessclients/web/src/index.js:90 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookiesdocument.cookie = hintCookieString(formatHint(sub), hintDomainFor(window.location.hostname, hintDomain), window.location.protocol === "https:");Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorydeploy/logto/deploy.sh:11 · References a credential file in the home directory# LOGTO_SSH_KEY path to ssh private key (default: ~/.ssh/id_rsa)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/logto/deploy.sh:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "==> Ensuring .env exists on server (only generated on first deploy)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/logto/deploy.sh:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# - .env file with LOGTO_DOMAIN, LOGTO_ENDPOINT, LOGTO_ADMIN_ENDPOINT,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/logto/bootstrap-apps.py:306 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("\n=== paste into .env files ===\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorydeploy/logto/deploy.sh:26 · References a credential file in the home directorySSH_KEY="${LOGTO_SSH_KEY:-$HOME/.ssh/id_rsa}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/logto/deploy.sh:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# LOGTO_SSH_KEY path to ssh private key (default: ~/.ssh/id_rsa)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/logto/bootstrap-apps.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileseach product's .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/logto/deploy.sh:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ ! -f .env ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
document.cookie accessclients/web/src/index.js:87 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookiesconst readHint = () => (hintOn() ? parseHint(readHintCookie(document.cookie)) : { kind: "unknown", raw: null });Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/logto/deploy.sh:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# POSTGRES_PASSWORD set (see .env.example; generated below if missing)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/mcp_core/auth.py:405 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials# Only a dev-bypass server with no Logto configured may pass tokens unverified.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/logto/docker-compose.yml:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Pinned: `latest` moves without notice. Bump deliberately via LOGTO_IMAGE in .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddeploy/logto/deploy.sh:59 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 .envFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Credential pass-through configurationtests/test_integration.py:208 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials"""Dev bypass token -> auth + billing + logging all work."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
document.cookie accessclients/web/test/switch.test.js:19 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookies/** document.cookie that keeps name=value pairs and honours Domain (any), Max-Age=0. */Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddeploy/logto/verify.py:60 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/logto/logto_config.py:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespy logto_config.py apply --env-file <path/.env.prod> [--yes]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/logto/logto_config.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespy logto_config.py plan --env-file <path/.env.prod>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/logto/logto_config.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespy logto_config.py import --env-file <path/.env.prod>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/logto/logto_config.py:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespy logto_config.py snapshot --env-file <path/.env.prod>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_core/mcp_mount.py:579 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfastapi_mcp_server.mount_sse(mount_path=mount_path_legacy)Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/live/conftest.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = pathlib.Path(__file__).parent.parent / ".env.live"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/live/conftest.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesGated by RUN_LIVE_TESTS=1. Requires tests/.env.live with real credentials.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈561 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-core-auth@0.6.1 as of 49 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

15 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim swapp1990: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. document.cookie access≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim swapp1990Propose a patch to the maintainer