mcp-common@0.34.2
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Oneiric-Native foundation library providing battle-tested patterns for MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers, with YAML configuration, Rich UI, and CLI lifecycle management" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.- It will ask for
- unknown until the next run
- Where it talks to
- unknown until the next run
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Not enough was observed to say yet. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-common` runs it now and prints the full answer.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.False, "--force", help="Force start (kill existing process if stale)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.".env/"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.False, "--force", help="Force kill (SIGKILL) if timeout"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.settings = MCPServerSettings(base_url="https://api.example.com/")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- Update the "AI Code Generation Best Practices" checklist in CLAUDE.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."""Force kill the server process."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- AI assistants should update CLAUDE.md and RULES.md weekly or after pre-commit failuresFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-common@0.34.2 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.