mcp-code-editor@0.1.24
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "A FastMCP server providing powerful code editing tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.- It will ask for
- unknown until the next run
- Where it talks to
- unknown until the next run
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-code-editor` runs it now and prints the full answer.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
".mypy_cache", ".tox", "venv", ".venv", "env", ".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(["taskkill", "/PID", str(pid), "/T", "/F"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Final force kill if neededFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.".mypy_cache", ".tox", "venv", ".venv", "env", ".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".mypy_cache", ".tox", "venv", ".venv", "env", ".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Last resort: system-level force killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(["taskkill", "/PID", str(pid), "/T"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Force mode: immediate killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.force: Whether to force kill the processFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Windows implementation - use /T flag to kill process treeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.force: Whether to force kill the processFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if item.name.startswith('.') and item.name not in ['.gitignore', '.env']:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.self.process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, **subprocess_kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-code-editor@0.1.24 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.