Skills/PyPI/mcp-coda

mcp-coda@0.13.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Coda — docs, pages, tables, rows, formulas, permissions and automation. Runs with writes, or locked read-only via MCP_READ_ONLY" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher vish288 · publishing for 266 daysInstalls 1,876Last detonated 7d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-coda -- uvx mcp-coda
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-coda` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/mcp-coda
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_helpers.py:273 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_load_file(str(tmp_path), "../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesCHANGELOG.md:371 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file- docs: add release workflow and architecture details to AGENTS.md (#2) (03f04ab)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_resources.py:121 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresult = json.loads(await doc_schema_resource("../etc/passwd", ctx))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:31 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN useradd --create-home --uid 10001 app && chown -R app:app /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesCHANGELOG.md:280 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file- docs: add Documentation Freshness rule to AGENTS.md (#24) (241fd00)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `src/mcp_coda/__init__.py` — click CLI, loads `.env` via python-dotenv, runs the FastMCP serverFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/unit/test_client.py:393 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingcfg = CodaConfig(token="tok", base_url="https://user:[email protected]/apis/v1")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,508 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-coda@0.13.0 as of 4 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.