Skills/PyPI/mcp-cli-agent

mcp-cli-agent@1.2.6

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "MCP-enabled AI assistant with tool integration" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher amranu · publishing for 504 daysInstalls 26Last detonated 7d ago
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Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

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unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

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Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsconfig.py:272 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env", env_file_encoding="utf-8", env_prefix="", extra="ignore"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsconfig.py:1306 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Read existing .env file if it existsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsconfig.py:1308 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif os.path.exists(".env"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrun_tests.py:48 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["python", "-m", "black", "--check", "."])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrun_tests.py:37 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsconfig.py:1310 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswith open(".env", "r") as f:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsagent.py:210 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Save to persistent config instead of .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsconfig.py:1264 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Save current configuration to .env file, preserving existing variables."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:658 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# .env file - multiple provider configurationsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrun_tests.py:43 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsagent.py:234 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Save to persistent config instead of .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsagent.py:247 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Save to persistent config instead of .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsagent.py:221 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Save to persistent config instead of .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_permission_socket.py:212 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicearguments={"command": "rm -rf /"},Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_permission_socket.py:204 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesarguments={"file_path": "/etc/passwd"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrun_tests.py:51 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["python", "-m", "isort", "--check-only", "."])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_permission_socket.py:212 · Destructive file system command detectedarguments={"command": "rm -rf /"},Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_hooks_directory.py:171 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files("after-cleanup.json", HookType.POST_TOOL_USE),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/unit/test_mcp_server.py:243 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/unit/test_mcp_server.py:276 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_hooks_directory.py:170 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files("post-format.json", HookType.POST_TOOL_USE),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrun_tests.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["python", "-m", "mypy", "--ignore-missing-imports", "cli_agent/"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈7,026 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-cli-agent@1.2.6 as of 4 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim amranu: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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