mcp-builder-forge@0.3.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "The forge that builds MCP servers — Build, maintain and orchestrate MCP servers for Linux system administration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.- It will ask for
- unknown until the next run
- Where it talks to
- unknown until the next run
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-builder-forge` runs it now and prints the full answer.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"sudoers": "/etc/sudoers.d",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."sudoers": "/etc/sudoers.d",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."sudoers": "/etc/sudoers.d",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."sudoers": "/etc/sudoers.d",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."outputPrompt": "Review the saved Python file for MCP tool safety. Check ONLY functions decorated with @mcp.tool (or @server.tool, @app.tool). For each decorated tool function, validate:\n\n1. **No unFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."sudoers": "/etc/sudoers.d",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."sudoers": "/etc/sudoers.d",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."sudoers": "/etc/sudoers.d",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.description="Verify file permissions on security-sensitive paths. Checks ownership, mode bits, and SUID/SGID flags against hardening baselines for files like /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, SSH keys, and crFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.description=f"Read authentication log ({paths['auth']}). Shows login attempts, sudo usage, SSH connections, and PAM events.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."sudoers": "/etc/sudoers.d",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."sudoers": "/etc/sudoers.d",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.validate_no_shell_metacharacters("ls; rm -rf /", "cmd_field")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."Some zypper commands require root privileges"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.check = await executor.execute(f"kill -0 {{pid}} 2>/dev/null && echo RUNNING || echo DONE", timeout=5, raw=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = await executor.execute(f"kill -{{signal.upper()}} {{pid}}", timeout=5, raw=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."outputPrompt": "Review the saved Python file for MCP tool safety. Check ONLY functions decorated with @mcp.tool (or @server.tool, @app.tool). For each decorated tool function, validate:\n\n1. **No unFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.validate_argument("cmd; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.inner_cmd = f"sudo bash -l -c '{{command}}'" if sudo else f"bash -l -c '{{command}}'"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.validate_argument("cmd; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.validate_no_shell_metacharacters("echo hi > /etc/passwd", "cmd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.validate_no_shell_metacharacters("ls; rm -rf /", "cmd_field")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.cmd = f"sudo {{cmd}}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-builder-forge@0.3.0 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jacs-factory: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.