mcp-browser@2.2.63
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Browser control and console log capture for AI coding assistants via MCP" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.- It will ask for
- unknown until the next run
- Where it talks to
- unknown until the next run
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-browser` runs it now and prints the full answer.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
echo -e "${YELLOW}Set CHROME_EXECUTABLE_PATH in .env.development or install Chrome${NC}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.cp "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env.development" "$ENV_FILE" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.ENV_FILE="$PROJECT_ROOT/.env.development"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.ENV_FILE="${PROJECT_ROOT}/.env.development"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.ENV_FILE="${PROJECT_ROOT}/.env.development"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if kill -0 $CHROME_PID 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.print(f"{Colors.RED}ERROR: .env.local not found{Colors.NC}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.print(f"{Colors.YELLOW}Create .env.local with required tokens:{Colors.NC}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env_file = PROJECT_ROOT / '.env.local'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.SystemExit: If .env.local not found or invalidFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.env_file = Path(".env.development")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if kill -0 "$CHROME_PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y pipxFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""Load environment variables from .env.local file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.kill "$SERVER_PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.cwd_result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Then scan all ports and kill ALL mcp-browser processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.cov_available = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."fix": "Restart server: kill existing process and run 'mcp-browser start'",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc_result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.).returncode == 0 and subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.kill "$CHROME_PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$OLD_PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if kill -0 "$SERVER_PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Only kill if process cwd matches THIS projectFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc_result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if kill -0 "$OLD_PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- `chrome://extensions` → enable Developer mode → “Load unpacked” → select `~/mcp-browser-extensions/chrome/`Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.- `chrome://extensions` → enable Developer mode → “Load unpacked” → select `~/mcp-browser-extensions/chrome/`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.this.log("Article content post-prep: " + articleContent.innerHTML);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.2. Enable "Developer mode"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.2. Enable "Developer mode"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.- `chrome://extensions` → enable Developer mode → “Load unpacked” → select `~/mcp-browser-extensions/chrome/`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-browser@2.2.63 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim browserpymcp: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.