Skills/PyPI/mcp-behave

mcp-behave@0.1.3

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Runtime behavioral auditor for MCP servers — strace-based scope-violation detection" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher navid72m · publishing for 142 daysInstalls 30Last detonated 8d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-behave` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Reads credential paths from the home directory; Privileged sudo command; References a credential file in the home directory. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/mcp-behave
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directorytargets/leaky_server.py:29 · Reads credential paths from the home directorywith open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")) as f: # reads a secretFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/mcp_behave/cli.py:26 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo mcp-behave <server-command>Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:22 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesrun: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y straceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellDockerfile:10 · Remote installer piped to shellRUN curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell patternDockerfile:6 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeRUN curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash - \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorytargets/leaky_server.py:29 · References a credential file in the home directorywith open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")) as f: # reads a secretFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/test_fixture_servers.py:20 · References a credential file in the home directoryserver's ~/.ssh/id_rsa read hits something."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/mcp_behave/cli.py:28 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesIf you're already running with sudo and still see this, System IntegrityFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/test_fixture_servers.py:63 · References a credential file in the home directoryf"leaky server's ~/.ssh/id_rsa read was not detected. findings: {findings}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_behave/cli.py:88 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"`python -m mcp_server_fetch`). For --transport sse/"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_fixture_servers.py:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesf"leaky server's ~/.ssh/id_rsa read was not detected. findings: {findings}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_behave/report.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSENSITIVE = (".ssh", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", ".env", ".aws", "credentials",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstargets/leaky_server.py:29 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswith open(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/id_rsa")) as f: # reads a secretFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell patternDockerfile:10 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeRUN curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_behave/report.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".netrc", "/etc/shadow", ".kube", ".docker/config")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun.sh:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# canary files in ./sandbox_home are used as ~/.ssh, ~/.env, etc.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_fixture_servers.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesserver's ~/.ssh/id_rsa read hits something."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellDockerfile:6 · Remote installer piped to shellRUN curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash - \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageDockerfile:14 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# server directly, not a uvx/npx downloader. Tracing through uvx/npx pollutesFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_fixture_servers.py:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(home / ".env").write_text("CANARY_SECRET=canary\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:4 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:8 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 24 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-behave@0.1.3 as of 11 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim navid72m: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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