mcp-background-job@0.1.2
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for executing long-running shell commands asynchronously" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.- It will ask for
- unknown until the next run
- Where it talks to
- unknown until the next run
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-background-job` runs it now and prints the full answer.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
r"curl.*\|.*sh", # Prevent curl | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.KillOutput indicating the result of the kill operationFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.self.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Input for kill tool."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.raise ToolError(f"Failed to kill job: {str(e)}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r"wget.*\|.*sh", # Prevent wget | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r"sudo\s+rm", # Prevent sudo rmFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r"curl.*\|.*bash", # Prevent curl | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r"curl.*\|.*sh", # Prevent curl | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Output from kill tool."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Force kill if graceful termination failsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Try to kill completed jobFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r"curl.*\|.*bash", # Prevent curl | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Trying to kill again should return FalseFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Shutdown should kill running jobsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Try to kill completed jobFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Cleanup should kill the processFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for mcp-background-job@0.1.2 as of 11 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dylan-gluck: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.