Skills/PyPI/mcp-anything

mcp-anything@0.2.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "One command to turn any software into an MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher type-mcp · joined 0 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_anything/pipeline/package.py:101 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_anything/pipeline/package_mcp_use.py:113 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmcp_anything/analysis/help_parser.py:64 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_anything/serve.py:74 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_anything/emit/typescript_mcp_use/phase.py:70 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_anything/conformance/runner.py:77 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_anything/emit/typescript_mcp_use/phase.py:56 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_anything/analysis/help_parser.py:313 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_anything/pipeline/package_mcp_use.py:90 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagemcp_anything/pipeline/package_mcp_use.py:43 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagemcp_anything/pipeline/package.py:173 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagemcp_anything/pipeline/package_mcp_use.py:45 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesmcp_anything/pipeline/document.py:31 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_anything/pipeline/package_mcp_use.py:114 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)mcp_anything/pipeline/package_mcp_use.py:210 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_anything/pipeline/package.py:115 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈49 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim type-mcp: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
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