Skills/PyPI/mcp-agent-security-scanner

mcp-agent-security-scanner@0.1.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Security scanner for MCP (Model Context Protocol) server configurations and AI agent tool permissions." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher martian7777 · joined 0 days agoInstalls 31Last detonated 2 h ago

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/mcp-scan
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/faketime
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_cli.py:27 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_scan/engine.py:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmcp_scan/cli.py:8 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_cli.py:18 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_cli.py:35 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_engine.py:313 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
GitHub token pattern detectedtests/test_engine.py:94 · GitHub token pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested tokenFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
AWS access key pattern detectedtests/test_engine.py:83 · AWS access key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested keyFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_sarif.py:14 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_engine.py:343 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_engine.py:313 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_engine.py:343 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:120 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_sarif.py:14 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈69 tok
1 file · 24 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim martian7777: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. GitHub token pattern detected≈ +2 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim martian7777Propose a patch to the maintainer