Skills/PyPI/marktplaats-mcp

marktplaats-mcp@0.2.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Marktplaats.nl and 2dehands.be: search, monitor and manage Dutch and Belgian classifieds from Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor and any MCP client." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher jasp-nerd · joined 1 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 3 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/marktplaats-mcp
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:8 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/marktplaats_mcp/cli.py:246 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/listing_vip.json:35 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressDockerfile:21 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressDockerfile:21 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/search_2dehands.json:170 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.nl.md:333 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/facets_bikes.json:191 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.nl.md:99 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/search_2dehands.json:172 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/facets_bikes.json:361 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.nl.md:75 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/facets_bikes.json:215 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.nl.md:31 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:68 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.nl.md:270 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/facets_bikes.json:189 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiontests/fixtures/facets_bikes.json:213 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈76 tok
1 file · 61 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jasp-nerd: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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