Skills/PyPI/macaulay2-mcp

macaulay2-mcp@0.1.5

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Macaulay2: Groebner bases, resolutions, Betti tables, and more, for Claude Code, opencode, and any MCP client" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher youngsu-kim · joined 0 days agoInstalls 614Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Image alt text carrying instructions; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/macaulay2-mcp
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedbench/run_bench.sh:24 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Image alt text carrying instructionsREADME.md:28 · Image alt text carrying instructionsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:31 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell pattern.github/workflows/ci.yml:35 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:32 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/macaulay2_mcp/config.py:51 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell pattern.github/workflows/release.yml:18 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.github/workflows/ci.yml:35 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:30 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/macaulay2_mcp/config.py:53 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.github/workflows/release.yml:18 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/macaulay2_mcp/config.py:211 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/macaulay2_mcp/config.py:181 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_gatekeep.py:35 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/macaulay2_mcp/gatekeep.py:7 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_gatekeep.py:35 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_gatekeep.py:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedbench/run_bench.sh:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,699 tok
2 files · 42 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for macaulay2-mcp@0.1.5 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim youngsu-kim: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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