ltspice-mcp@0.7.0
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "SPICE simulation through an MCP server and an in-process Python API for LTspice and ngspice. Supports schematic editing, sweeps, Monte Carlo analysis, and structured measurements." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher cognitohazard · joined 8 days agoInstalls 1,151Last detonated 2 h ago
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph); Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/ltspice-mcp
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run
Static findings
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ltspice_mcp/api/_detach.py:265 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/log_decode.py:28 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ltspice_mcp/api/_detach.py:339 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ltspice_mcp/api/_detach.py:351 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/wsl.py:151 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/raw_decode.py:39 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/wsl.py:87 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05HIGH
Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)src/ltspice_mcp/assets/guide/rf.md:28 · Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ltspice_mcp/api/_detach.py:50 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/proc_kill.py:7 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/simulator.py:637 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/decoded_log.py:34 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/simulator.py:647 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ltspice_mcp/tools/receipts.py:166 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/wsl.py:435 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/wsl.py:128 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/wsl.py:198 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ltspice_mcp/tools/run_code.py:434 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/wsl.py:351 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/wsl.py:162 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/wsl.py:423 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/wsl.py:441 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/ltspice_mcp/lib/wsl.py:200 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07Cost to the agent
Instructions loaded
≈81 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for ltspice-mcp@0.7.0 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cognitohazard: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim cognitohazardPropose a patch to the maintainer