Is live-audio-intelligence-mcp@0.1.3 safe to install?

Skills/PyPI/live-audio-intelligence-mcp

live-audio-intelligence-mcp@0.1.3

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Institutional-grade MCP server for live financial webcast transcription and vocal stress analysis" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ykshah1309 · joined 5 days agoInstalls 175Last detonated 2 h ago

$claude mcp add live-audio-intelligence-mcp -- uvx live-audio-intelligence-mcp

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Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations

t+CategoryObserved action

0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle

0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1

0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/date

0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout

0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/live-audio-intelligence-mcp

0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)

0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only

0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/live_audio_intelligence_mcp/audio_streamer.py:323 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_url_validation.py:61 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/live_audio_intelligence_mcp/audio_streamer.py:306 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Process kill commandsrc/live_audio_intelligence_mcp/audio_streamer.py:162 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.

AST05

MEDIUM

Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_url_validation.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈68 tok

1 file · 25 in bundle

Tool list per prompt

≈0 tok

0 tools · 0 per tool

Handshake

no reply

launch to tools/list, stdio

Undocumented tools

description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.