Skills/PyPI/lipservice

lipservice@0.1.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Talk is cheap. Singing is free. Sixteen voices that sing and speak on your own CPU" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher lipservice · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 489Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
lipservice.dev (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to lipservice.dev, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx lipservice

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpython/lipservice/_audio.py:109 · Python subprocess execution detectedself._proc = subprocess.Popen([_aplay(), "-q", "-D", device, clip.save(os.path.join(self._dir.name, "clip.wav"))], stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpython/tests/check.py:39 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(args, check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpython/lipservice/__init__.py:89 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([*player, self.save(os.path.join(d, "clip.wav"))], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpython/lipservice/_audio.py:102 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn _aplay_list(subprocess.run([_aplay(), "-L"], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True).stdout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpython/_build.py:106 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["cargo", "build", "--release", "--locked", "--target", target, "--manifest-path", os.path.join(CRATE, "Cargo.toml")], check=True, env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternpyproject.toml:45 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codebefore-all = "curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --profile minimal"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codepython/tests/docs.py:80 · Python exec or eval of computed codeexec(compile(block, where, "exec"), names)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsengine/src/front.rs:2225 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files/// A name in a path or after a dot: a file's name, else its parts with dot between (.env.local).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpython/tests/docs.py:92 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run([os.path.join(os.path.dirname(sys.executable), "lipservice"), *words[1:]], env=env, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsengine/src/front.rs:2270 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files/// A name after a dot, as a hidden file has it: .env dot env, .gitignore.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpython/tests/mcp_check.py:309 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "lipservice", "mcp", "--out", os.path.join(d, "not-there")], stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpython/tests/mcp_check.py:88 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-m", "lipservice", "mcp", *args], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellpyproject.toml:45 · Remote installer piped to shellbefore-all = "curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh -s -- -y --profile minimal"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 54 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for lipservice@0.1.1 as of 53 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim lipservice: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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lipservice@0.1.1 safety verdict: Caution (not started) — KillerSkills