Skills/PyPI/layered-memory-mcp

layered-memory-mcp@3.5.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Layered Memory MCP Server — Durable common-core memory for AI agents: L0 index, L1 knowledge, TODO and provenance, with deterministic persistence routing" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher laiguapi · joined 0 days agoInstalls 45Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-05 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/layered-memory-mcp
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/layered_memory_mcp/config.py:298 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/layered_memory_mcp/adapters/generic_file.py:116 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/layered_memory_mcp/session_scanner.py:301 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Refusal suppressionREADME.md:585 · Refusal suppression — attempting to prevent safety responses · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/layered_memory_mcp/adapters/generic_file.py:272 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/layered_memory_mcp/write_guard/__init__.py:257 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/layered_memory_mcp/config.py:1040 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/layered_memory_mcp/config.py:746 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/layered_memory_mcp/config.py:763 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/layered_memory_mcp/config.py:796 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/layered_memory_mcp/config.py:484 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/layered_memory_mcp/config.py:776 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/layered_memory_mcp/server.py:2539 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/layered_memory_mcp/server.py:2636 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/layered_memory_mcp/write_guard/plugin/__init__.py:1 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/layered_memory_mcp/server.py:2637 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈78 tok
1 file · 58 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim laiguapi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim laiguapiPropose a patch to the maintainer