kicad-mcp-pro@4.16.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Production-grade MCP server for KiCad EDA—PCB design, DRC, simulation, BOM, DFM, and manufacturing." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
KICAD_API_TOKENKICAD_MCP_AUTH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: KICAD_API_SOCKET, KICAD_MCP_DESKTOP_UV, KICAD_MCP_ENABLE_EXPERIMENTAL_TOOLS, KICAD_MCP_HOST, KICAD_MCP_LOCALE, KICAD_MCP_LOG_LEVEL, KICAD_MCP_OPENCODE_CONFIG_VERSION, KICAD_MCP_OPERATING_MODE, KICAD_MCP_PORT, KICAD_MCP_PROJECT_DIR, KICAD_MCP_TELEMETRY_ENABLED, KICAD_MCP_TIMEOUT_MS, KICAD_MCP_TRANSPORT, KICAD_MCP_URL, UV_TOOL_DIR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso kicad.org, astral.sh, inspect.ai, buymeacoffee.com, oaslananka.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names kicad.org, astral.sh, inspect.ai, buymeacoffee.com, oaslananka.dev as well as its own vendor. The guard injects KICAD_API_TOKEN, KICAD_MCP_AUTH_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# Keep the same precedence while excluding .env during pytest runs.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Load .env into os.environ at startup so unprefixed third-party credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Start the server in a subprocess and hot-reload on .py source changes.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.server_proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self._server_proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.bool, typer.Option("--watch", help=option_help("Watch source files and hot-reload on changes"))Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.{"mcpServers": {"kicad": {"type": "http", "url": url, "env": env}}},Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for kicad-mcp-pro@4.16.0 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim oaslananka: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.