Skills/PyPI/karellen-lsp-mcp

karellen-lsp-mcp@0.2.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP Server bridging to LSP servers for structured code introspection" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher karellen · joined 0 days agoInstalls 306Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-11-05 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approval. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL
Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approvalsetup.py:26 · Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approvalFix: Declare and request only the permissions the task needs.
AST02
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessetup.py:26 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedkarellen_lsp_mcp/daemon_client.py:97 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)setup.py:26 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesPKG-INFO:259 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedkarellen_lsp_mcp/lsp_adapter.py:404 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsetup.py:26 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction fileskarellen_lsp_mcp.egg-info/PKG-INFO:259 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsetup.py:26 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandkarellen_lsp_mcp/server.py:312 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedkarellen_lsp_mcp/lsp_adapter.py:449 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 22 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approval≈ +9 on the totalDeclare and request only the permissions the task needs.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim karellen: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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