Skills/PyPI/iflow-mcp-x-twitter-mcp

iflow-mcp-x-twitter-mcp@0.1.11

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Twitter search tool for FastMCP using Tweepy" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher rafaljanicki · joined 3 days agoInstalls 17Last detonated 54 min ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-04 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection; Context shift attempt; Authorization escalation language. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.5sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.6sprocessexec .venv/bin/x-twitter-mcp-server
0.6sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/x-twitter-mcp-server': No such file or directory
0.6sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompt injectionREADME.md:460 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Context shift attemptREADME.md:460 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational modeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.github/workflows/pypi_deploy.yaml:23 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:460 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/x_twitter_mcp/server.py:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell pattern.github/workflows/pypi_deploy.yaml:23 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim rafaljanicki: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim rafaljanicki