Skills/PyPI/iflow-mcp-wiggitywhitney-mcp-commit-story

iflow-mcp-wiggitywhitney-mcp-commit-story@0.1.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for engineering commit story journal entries." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher your-name-your.email · joined 9 days agoInstalls 25Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-04 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.5sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.5sprocessexec .venv/bin/mcp-commit-story
0.5sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/mcp-commit-story': No such file or directory
0.5sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/mcp_commit_story/context_collection.py:457 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_commit_story/cursor_db/workspace_detection.py:428 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationtests/test_mcp_server_telemetry_integration.py:313 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_commit_story/git_utils.py:449 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim your-name-your.email: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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