iflow-mcp-possible055-relace-mcp@0.2.5.dev4
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Unofficial Relace MCP Server - Fast code merging via Relace API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher possible055 · joined 0 days agoInstalls 18Last detonated 38 min ago
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-04 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.3sprocessexec .venv/bin/relace-mcp
0.3sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/relace-mcp': No such file or directory
0.3sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/relace_mcp/server.py:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/relace_mcp/server.py:74 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/relace_mcp/tools/search/_impl/bash.py:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagsrc/relace_mcp/prompts/apply_openai.yaml:17 · Fake instruction boundary tagFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/relace_mcp/repo/cloud/sync.py:104 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/relace_mcp/utils.py:118 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/relace_mcp/repo/local/backend.py:22 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/relace_mcp/lsp/client.py:860 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/relace_mcp/repo/core/git.py:50 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/relace_mcp/repo/core/git.py:60 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/relace_mcp/repo/core/git.py:79 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/relace_mcp/repo/core/git.py:29 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/relace_mcp/repo/core/git.py:11 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/relace_mcp/repo/local/backend.py:93 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/relace_mcp/repo/cloud/sync.py:131 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/relace_mcp/tools/search/_impl/bash.py:113 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim possible055: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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