Skills/PyPI/iflow-mcp-mcp-pa-ai-agent

iflow-mcp-mcp-pa-ai-agent@0.1.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "A personal assistant AI agent built with the Model Context Protocol (MCP)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · joined 9 days agoInstalls 21Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-03 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; OS command execution function call detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 4 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
3.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
3.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
3.5sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.4
3.5sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 1)
3.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.py:76 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedsetup.py:99 · OS command execution function call detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.py:77 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageMCP llms-full P.txt:1509 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.py:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedsetup.py:96 · OS command execution function call detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
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