Is iflow-mcp-laurentvv-crawl4ai-mcp@0.1.0 safe to install?

Skills/PyPI/iflow-mcp-laurentvv-crawl4ai-mcp

iflow-mcp-laurentvv-crawl4ai-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "A powerful web crawling tool that integrates with AI assistants via the MCP (Machine Conversation Protocol)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher laurentvv · joined 5 days agoInstalls 17Last detonated 2 h ago

$claude mcp add iflow-mcp-laurentvv-crawl4ai-mcp -- uvx iflow-mcp_laurentvv-crawl4ai-mcp

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Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-03 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations

t+CategoryObserved action

0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle

0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1

0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout

0.4sprocessexec .venv/bin/iflow_mcp_laurentvv_crawl4ai_mcp

0.4sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/iflow_mcp_laurentvv_crawl4ai_mcp': No such file or directory

0.4sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)

0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL

Prompt injectionlang/README.id.md:13 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.

AST01

CRITICAL

Prompt injectionlang/README.id.md:8 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.

AST01

CRITICAL

Prompt injectionlang/README.id.md:34 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.

AST01

MEDIUM

Fake instruction boundary tag.github/copilot-instructions.md:1 · Fake instruction boundary tagFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.

AST01

CRITICAL

Prompt injectionlang/README.id.md:74 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.

AST01

CRITICAL

Prompt injectionlang/README.id.md:17 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.

AST01

MEDIUM

Fake instruction boundary tag.github/copilot-instructions.md:3 · Fake instruction boundary tagFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.

AST01