Skills/PyPI/iflow-mcp-groundng-vibeshift

iflow-mcp-groundng-vibeshift@0.1.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "VibeShift - Security Engineer MCP Server for AI Coding Assistants" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · joined 8 days agoInstalls 14Last detonated 8 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-03 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.4sprocessexec .venv/bin/vibeshift
0.4sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/vibeshift': No such file or directory
0.4sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/utils/utils.py:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmcp_server_original.py:91 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/utils/utils.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/utils/utils.py:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/utils/utils.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/utils/utils.py:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmcp_server.py:105 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/security/nuclei_scanner.py:38 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/security/semgrep_scanner.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/security/zap_scanner.py:182 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/security/zap_scanner.py:283 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/security/zap_scanner.py:69 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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